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The question what to do about sexual and racial dis-
crimination in Canadian society is still a pressing one. 
Controversy surrounds the introduction of affirmative 
action plans—not only because they are perceived as a 
threat to the privileged, especially in times of low 
economic growth—but also because people with a gen-
uine desire for justice are concerned about whether these 
plans are a form of 'reverse' discrimination designed to 
'compensate' women and racial minorities for past in-
justices at the expense of young white males, who did not 
cause the injustices in the first place. Some writers have 
defended affirmative action as a form of compensatory 
justice.1 Others have argued that the best reasons for 
adopting affirmative action are not backward-looking 
concerns to compensate for past injustices but forward-
looking concerns to create a better society, especially to 
raise the social and economic status of oppressed groups 
and to provide role models for young people.2 Although 
it is not widely understood, an equally important 
forward-looking reason for affirmative action programs 
is that they help to prevent further discrimination against 
women and racial minorities. 
This paper is an attempt to clarify some of the 
philosophical and practical problems involved in preven-
ting discrimination. It is my argument that we cannot 
prevent discrimination with anti-discrimination laws and 
policies so long as the degree and kind of sex prejudice 
that is embedded in our socity persists. Therefore, we 
cannot hope to eliminate the adverse effects of 
discrimination in the foreseeable future without adopting 
new hiring practices—either a quota system or some 
form of preferential hiring. 
DISCRIMINATION 
Discrimination, in the pejorative sense, is usually 
defined as treating some irrelevant characteristic of a 
person or group as though it were relevant to the 
distribution of some good.3 Turning down an applicant 
for a job because she is black would be considered a 
classic case of discrimination. The problem is, of course, 
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to specify just what sorts of characteristics are relevant to 
the distribution of just what sorts of goods. Since those 
who want to outlaw discrimination are understandably 
unwilling to leave it to the law enforcers to decide which 
characteristics are relevant ones, anti-discrimination or 
'human rights' legislation usually specifies that certain 
characteristics shall never (or almost never) be con-
sidered relevant. A basic form of the legislation is this: 
No person or organization shall exclude or prevent 
another person from doing X on the grounds that 
he/she is a member of class A (where class A is a 
'protected' class, e.g., a race, religion, colour, sex). 
Such legislation may at first seem to avoid the problem 
of relevant characteristics; however, we find ourselves 
confronting it again when we consider how to enforce the 
laws against discrimination, for it will often be difficult 
to determine that membership in a protected class has 
been the grounds of refusal to, for instance, employ 
someone, or that reasonable cause did not exist for the 
refusal. This is a general problem of enforcing anti-
discrimination legislation—the difficulty of distinguish-
ing genuine demands for qualifications from 
discriminatory behaviour. But it is not only a problem of 
enforcement. It is a problem of understanding the nature 
of discrimination, of knowing when we are really 
behaving in a non-discriminatory manner (and not 
merely deceiving ourselves about it), and even of judging 
whether it is always desirable to prevent discrimination 
against groups we want to protect. 
I shall now examine the clear and the not-so-clear 
areas of discrimination against women and the prej-
udices which feed them both. Much of what I say will be 
applicable to discrimination and prejudice against 
groups other than women, but I restrict my examination 
to these kinds of sex discrimination and sex prejudice 
because I believe they have important features which 
may be unique. I shall use the example of hiring prac-
tices to illustrate problems common to all situations 
where there is the possibility of genuine demands for 
qualifications. Moreover, I shall restrict the example to 
hiring for government jobs (i.e., public service jobs with 
competitive selection procedures) so that no question will 
arise about the private employer's right to hire whomever 
he/she prefers, and so that it will be clear that my con-
clusions are not remarks about capitalism but apply to 
any society in which both public service jobs and sex 
prejudices exist. 
There are three kinds of discrimination against women 
which can occur in the hiring process: 
(1) An employer (i.e., the person or persons who do 
the hiring for a job) refuses to consider hiring any 
woman for the job, for example by refusing to ac-
cept applications from women. 
(2) An employer consistently hires men rather than 
women who apply with equal qualifications. 
(3) An employer hires a man who is less qualified for 
the job than a woman applicant.4 
It is in category No. 1 that the clearest cases of sex 
discrimination occur. Such an employer may advertise 
for a man and may greet a woman applicant by stating 
that he/she wants a man for the job, that women should 
not be in this field of employment, etc. These are hardly 
cases in which the onlooker can be deceived; the evidence 
is overwhelming that the employer is excluding women 
from the job on the grounds that they are women. 
The employer, in honesty or in self-deception, may 
believe something like this: "I have nothing against 
women. It's just that they're such inefficient workers." 
We would call this belief a prejudice, because we know 
not only that it is false but also that there is so much 
available evidence against such a belief that if he/she 
had taken any interest in the evidence, he/she would not 
hold it. Either the employer is in the habit of forming 
beliefs on very little evidence and sticking to them or 
he/she is deceiving himself/herself and does have 
'something against women' which predisposes him/her 
to believe that they are inefficient. In any case, the em-
ployer has pre-judged all (or nearly all) 5 women, in-
eluding the applicant, and shows no interest in the 
evidence of their abilities to do the job. 
On the other hand, the employer's refusal to consider 
women for the job may be based on a belief that has some 
evidence in its favour and no available evidence against 
it. For example, suppose the employer were hiring people 
for an engineering job which no woman has successfully 
performed anywhere and in which he/she has already 
given several women an opportunity to work. He/she has 
concluded on the basis of this evidence that women can-
not do the job, and we would not consider that belief a 
prejudice, because the employer has shown interest in 
the evidence and the available evidence does not con-
tradict the belief. 
To say that this employer's refusal to consider women 
for the job is based on a belief which is not a prejudice is 
not to say that his/her refusal is not a case of sex 
discrimination or that we should not disapprove of it. It 
is a case of sex discrimination, because he/she is 
excluding each woman on the grounds of her sex without 
considering her qualifications to do the job. Fur-
thermore, there are several good reasons to guard against 
the employer's acting on his/her belief: 
(a) Evidence of the form "No women have successfully 
done X , " for beliefs of the form "No woman can do 
X " or even, "Most women cannot do X , " is doubt-
ful evidence; for when we ask if women have had a 
decent opportunity to do X (decent enough to 
justify the belief), we often find that we cannot an-
swer "yes", and that we become embroiled in the 
very complex problems of understanding just when 
such an opportunity exists. We need some ex-
planation to add to "No women have successfully 
done X " before it becomes plausible to say, "No 
woman can do X , " or even "Most women cannot 
do X . " For example, a physiological explanation 
based on the differences between men and women 
will do as evidence for "No woman can do X . " A 
psychological or sociological explanation may do as 
evidence for "Most women cannot do X . " But 
when he/she has no explanation to back it up, an 
employer who acts on the belief "No woman can do 
X " by refusing to consider women's qualifications 
to do X is simply turning his/her back on possible 
counter-examples. 
(b) As Plato pointed out,6 even if there is evidence and 
an explanation for "Most women cannot do X , " as 
long as there is a way, independent of sex, to deter-
mine or estimate ability to do X , there is no good 
reason for using sex as a qualification. Individuals, 
not classes, have the abilities the employer seeks. 
(c) There is far more at stake for the applicant than for 
the employer. The employer may lose a little time 
by considering the qualifications of individual 
female applicants. If he/she refuses to do so, the 
applicant loses a chance of exercising her abilities 
in productive work. 
(d) There is more at stake for the community than for 
the employer. As John Stuart Mi l l was fond of 
remarking,7 the community stands to lose the work 
of the best person for the job. 
(e) The generalization, "Most women cannot do X , " if 
it is based on negative evidence and a strong 
psychological or sociological explanation, can be a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. Suppose (as seems likely) 
that many people need models of success with 
whom they can identify in order to develop 
abilities. Then, for example, if there are no women 
professors in a field, few women students go on to 
graduate study, very few become qualified to be 
professors, and the belief that most women cannot 
do it is reinforced. 
Furthermore, if women are not considered for a par-
ticular kind of job, no woman with her own interests in 
mind will train herself to do it, few women will succeed at 
it, and the belief that most women cannot do it will per-
sist. Thus, an employer's acting on the belief that most 
women cannot do a job puts women as a class at a disad-
vantage which seems easily corrected by adopting the 
practice of considering each applicant's qualifications 
regardless of sex. 
The form of anti-discrimination law discussed earlier 
outlaws type No. 1 discrimination of any kind. But I have 
been talking about cases of type No. 1 discrimination 
which are obvious to an observer. There are other cases 
which are not so obvious and may be difficult to prove. 
An employer may not in fact consider hiring women for a 
job, but if he/she accepts applications from women, then 
it may look to us like type No. 2 or type No. 3 
discrimination is going on. We may be able to prove that, 
but we will not be able to prove that type No. 1 is going 
on. 
Sometimes an employer declares that his/her policy is 
to hire the man if a man and a woman applicant are 
equally qualified, often because he/she believes that 
men, as the heads of families, need jobs more than 
women8 or that the proper sphere of women does not in-
clude the type of work in question, or because he/she 
believes that all women have some undesirable trait or 
lack some desirable trait, or because of a simple 
preference for working with men. Such a policy is a clear 
case of type No. 2 discrimination. 
Given a group of applicants with equal qualifications, 
we would expect those hired to be a random sample, in 
respect of sex, of the group, if the employer did the 
hiring without regard to sex. But the employer may be 
hiring with regard to some trait which is inversely 
correlated with being female and which is admittedly not 
a qualification for the job itself, for example likelihood to 
benefit the department basketball team. To prevent this 
kind of discrimination, which Mary Anne Warren has 
called 'secondary sexism,'9 we would have to require that 
employers hire on the basis of job qualifications alone 
and use some random procedure for deciding among 
equally-qualified applicants. 
If an employer has no women on a particular job, and 
we can prove that a substantial number of women ap-
plied with the same qualifications as the men who were 
hired, we can show that the employer used some other 
criteria besides qualifications, perhaps sex, perhaps 
some trait inversely correlated with being female, to 
select his/her employees. Furthermore, we assume that 
an employer should be looking for the best-qualified per-
son for the job—a fair assumption in the public service. 
So if we find that he/she has hired a man who is less 
qualified for the job than a woman applicant, we have 
good reason to believe that the employer is hiring at least 
partly on the basis of sex or of some trait inversely 
correlated with being female. In both these types of 
cases, the main difficulties of proof are defining 
qualifications and finding an adequate method of com-
paring them that will enable us to justify a claim that the 
members of a particular group of applicants have equal 
qualifications or a claim that one applicant is better 
qualified than another.10 
QUALIFICATIONS AS NECESSARY TRAITS 
It is tempting to limit the scope of 'qualifications' for a 
job to just those traits which are necessary for its per-
formance. It seems easier to decide between necessary 
and unnecessary traits than between genuinely useful 
traits and those which merely reflect the preferences of 
the employer (and it may in some cases be useful to cater 
to the preferences of the employer, however, irrational 
they are). Furthermore, although some useful traits 
would clearly be unfair requirements, it cannot be unfair 
to require a trait that is necessary to performing the job. 
So let us look first at how we could decide which traits 
are necessary and which are unnecessary. Ordinarily, we 
make a commonsense evaluation of the requirements of 
the job; for example, a mail-sorter must be able to read 
and must have enough manual dexterity to make piles of 
mail, and if we want the job well done, he/she must be 
quick thinking, honest and conscientious. Of course, the 
job can be done by someone who is slow, dishonest 
and/or careless, but it will not be done the way we want it 
done—quickly, reliably and thoroughly. An employee 
who is usually cheerful may greatly improve the ef-
ficiency of the mail-room, and ordinarily we would 
regard this as a bonus and not a necessity; but we could 
describe the new mail-sorter's job to include raising the 
morale of the other employees in the mail-room and im-
proving general efficiency, in which case cheerfulness 
and perhaps leadership qualities become necessary to 
doing the job. So our ideas of which traits are necessary 
in an employee depend on our description of an adequate 
performance of the job. 
I started by asking what sorts of traits will count as 
qualifications for a job; now we seem to be faced with a 
new question—what sorts of job descriptions will we ac-
cept?—for even if we limit the scope of 'qualifications' to 
those traits which are necessary to perform the job, it 
seems that an employer could call any traits 
'qualifications' by describing the job in such a way that it 
requires them. There is, of course, the limitation im-
posed by the type of anti-discrimination law we are con-
sidering, that certain traits are not allowed to count as 
qualifications under any job description (with a few 
stipulated exceptions),11 e.g., race, sex, religion. But 
unless we also set limits on the sorts of job descriptions 
we will accept, it will be so easy for an employer to justify 
either not having hired a particular person or class of 
persons or requiring whatever characteristics he/she 
prefers in an employee (including those closely correlated 
with sex, race, religion, etc.), that it will be impossible to 
prove or prevent even the most blatant cases of 
discrimination. 
Surely some job descriptions are unacceptable to us, 
even to those of us who are not particularly concerned 
about discrimination. For instance, although employees 
are often hired in part to flatter the employer, or to 
display the employer's status (as in the case of the at-
tractive receptionist who is carefully picked to impress 
the customers), the jobs are not announced or advertised 
under these descriptions, and applicants are rarely told 
that obsequiousness or a certain taste in clothing and 
makeup are requirements of the jobs. Perhaps it is 
because these job descriptions offend a wide-spread sen-
se of what sorts of tasks are compatible with human 
dignity. 1 2 For whatever reasons, we do now have some 
cultural (and legal) limitations on what sorts of jobs 
people should be hired to perform. And there are also 
limits to what descriptions of a job are believable. If an 
employer claims he hired only very strong men to work in 
his factory because the job requires heavy physical 
labour, and anyone who visits the factory can see that all 
the heavy work is done by machines, then his description 
of the job is plainly false and therefore unacceptable. 
Certainly our descriptions of public service jobs would 
and should depend on our ideas of what is in the public 
interest. In addition, for the purpose of making sex 
discrimination detectable and reducing its occurrence, I 
suggest it is possible to make the following requirements 
of job descriptions: 
(a) That they be true to the actual tasks to be per-
formed. 
(b) That they not be such as to require employees to 
have traits which are highly correlated with sex, 
unless it can be shown that the task which 
necessitates such traits is necessary for the public 
interest and cannot reasonably be accomplished in 
another way (for example by automation or by 
teamwork). 
(c) That they be made public and that they be used as 
the actual guidelines of hiring practices. 
When we use what I have called the commonsense 
evaluation of a job, we come up with requirements that 
may include abilities, skills, knowledge, character traits 
(such as honesty and conscientiousness) and experience, 
i.e., previous successful performance of the tasks in-
volved (in the case of jobs where the tasks are so complex 
as to require subtle combinations of abilities, skills, 
knowledge and character traits which it would be too dif-
ficult to break down into their parts). Furthermore, we 
will probably come up with various proofs of these on our 
list of necessary traits, such as testimonies of character 
and of previous successful performance, and perhaps 
certain test results, when we have tests that require the 
performance of tasks like those required in the job or ask 
questions which call for knowledge necessary in the job. 
STATISTICAL CORRELATIONS 
It is possible that our knowledge of statistical 
correlations and predictions would lead us to add items 
to our list of necessary traits that a commonsense 
evaluation of the job would never produce.1 3 For exam-
ple, suppose we know that people with normal-range 
blood pressure make fewer mistakes under stress than 
people with high blood pressure. Would we not want to 
make normal-range blood pressure a necessary trait of 
surgeons, air-traffic controllers and others who work in 
high-stress jobs which frequently involve life-and-death 
decisions? If the correlation were firmly established and 
very high, could any record of accuracy, no matter how 
long, overcome our qualms about an applicant with high 
blood pressure? 
On the other hand, we would probably have reser-
vations about acting on some information that statistical 
studies might yield. Suppose we know that mail-rooms 
composed of all married employees are 30% more ef-
ficient than those with single employees? Suppose factory 
workers between 16 and 35 years old have 20% higher 
productivity than all others? Suppose, as it is often 
claimed, the turnover rate of women in some jobs is so 
high that the time they work is not, on the average, worth 
the time invested in training them? Do we want to add to 
our list of necessary characteristics traits which are 
highly correlated either with requirements we arrived at 
by a commonsense evaluation of a job or with actual job 
performance? 
I pointed out in the first section that the generalization 
"Most women cannot do X " can be a self-fulfilling 
prophecy and that acting on it can put women as a class 
at a disadvantage which could be avoided by considering 
each applicant's suitability regardless of sex. Acting on 
statistical information like that suggested in the 
preceding paragraph is likely to rule out the possibility of 
social changes that would change the statistics. It may be 
possible to find and reduce or eliminate causal factors in 
the hypothetical inefficiency of having unmarried people 
in mail-rooms, lower productivity of factory workers over 
35, and high turnover rates of women in some jobs, but it 
will not happen if hiring practices conform to these 
statistics. 
Yet what of the blood pressure-mistakes correlation? 
Should we give people with high blood pressure a chance 
to prove that they are exceptions, where accuracy is a 
matter of life and death? Here we are brought back, as 
we were in the problem of describing jobs, to balancing 
the public interest against the desire to avoid putting 
classes of applicants at a disadvantage. Where success in 
the job is crucial to the consumers of the goods or ser-
vices, our scruples about using any statistical methods of 
prediction should be lessened. Otherwise, we should be 
wary of correlations and predictions, and seek out the 
best ways of judging the suitability of each individual ap-
plicant by his/her provable abilities, skills, knowledge, 
character traits and/or experience. 
Supposing still that we count only traits necessary to 
the performance of a job as 'qualifications' for the job, 
and supposing that we have a complete list of the 
necessary traits, how shall the employer choose an em-
ployee from among the applicants? The only applicants 
we will consider qualified for the job are those who have 
all the necessary traits, since by our hypothesis no one 
else can adequately perform the job. And how shall the 
employer choose among the qualified applicants? Not by 
comparing their qualifications, because among those 
who have the necessary traits, no one is more qualified 
than another. It might at first seem that someone who 
has more of a necessary trait than the others will be more 
qualified than them, but that is not true; for example, if 
conscientiousness is a necessary trait in a mail-sorter, it 
is not the case that the more conscientious the better the 
mail-sorter, since there is a point at which it interferes 
too much with speed, so that an approximate degree of 
conscientiousness will be the necessary trait which an ap-
plicant either does or does not have. Since the employer 
cannot compare their qualifications, he/she shall have to 
choose among qualified applicants by some random 
selection process, in order to safeguard against dis-
crimination and guarantee that qualifications are the 
only criteria used in hiring. 
QUALIFICATIONS AS BENEFICIAL TRAITS 
At this point we must consider whether we do want to 
limit the scope of 'qualifications' for a job to those traits 
which are necessary for its performance. We found that 
what we consider necessary depends on the job descrip-
tion we have, which should in turn depend on our ideas 
about what is in the public interest. But is it in the public 
interest to require employers to content themselves with 
asking for only the traits necessary to performing a job 
and then choosing randomly from among the qualified 
applicants? Surely some among the applicants who meet 
the requirements could do the job far better than others. 
Should we not allow employers to try to find the best per-
son for each job? The excellence of the work done by 
people who are best suited to a job often raises our stan-
dards of an adequate performance of the job; and a job 
description changes with the innovations brought to it by 
the people who do it. Indeed, this process on a large scale 
is a means by which the standard of living of a whole 
society is raised. Should we leave it to chance whether 
those most capable of bringing excellence to their work 
are hired, or should we let employers make some effort to 
find them? If we want to do the latter, we will have to 
allow them to compare the qualifications of those who 
meet the minimum requirements of the job; to do that we 
will have to extend the scope of 'qualifications' to include 
not only those traits which are necessary to performing a 
job but also those which are likely to be beneficial in 
some way and lead to excellent work. 
If we extend the scope of 'qualifications' beyond 
necessary traits to beneficial traits, will it not be more 
difficult for us to distinguish genuine qualifications from 
the preferences of the employer and therefore more dif-
ficult for us to discover and prove that an employer is 
hiring men preferentially over women with equal or bet-
ter qualifications? Let us see what can be done. 
We can at least limit the range of 'beneficial traits' to 
those traits which can plausibly be associated with the 
job. If we describe our government jobs according to our 
ideas of what is in the public interest, and if we employ 
the further requirements I suggested we make of ac-
ceptable job descriptions, then we will rule out practices 
like hiring someone partly for his ability to benefit the 
department basketball team (unless the job is described 
that way, which would have to be justified in terms of the 
public interest). Of course, there is plenty of room for 
disagreement over what is in the public interest, but, 
assuming we do have an acceptable job description, it 
does limit the range of traits which an employer can call 
genuine qualifications. Furthermore, for the reasons 
already given, I suggest we continue to be wary of 
statistical correlations and predictions and not consider 
them relevant to genuine qualifications unless an ex-
tremely important matter of public interest is involved; 
this limits our 'beneficial traits' to the commonsense 
classes of abilities, skills, knowledge, character traits 
and experience. Unfortunately, we now have the problem 
of comparing qualifications. 
SEX PREJUDICE AND COMPARING 
QUALIFICATIONS 
Comparing qualifications is difficult under the best 
conditions, i.e., in the absence of prejudices about class, 
sex, race, religion, etc. Actually, there are two kinds of 
comparison to be made: first, weighing one kind of 
beneficial trait against another, e.g., if one applicant has 
a lot of practical experience and another has a lot of for-
mal training; and second, comparing the values of the 
same kind of trait as had by more than one applicant, 
e.g., comparing the values of two applicants' experience. 
Al l comparisons of the qualifications of applicants are 
more or less complicated combinations of these two 
kinds of comparison. The second kind can sometimes 
be made with relative ease and objectivity, if the tasks 
required by the job are simple enough that reliable tests 
of the knowledge and abilities of applicants can be 
devised and the comparisons can be made by means of 
test scores. But both kinds are often difficult and, in our 
world, fraught with the dangers of prejudice. 
The kind of sex prejudice which enters into the process 
of comparing qualifications, unlike the kind that consists 
in beliefs that all women have some undesirable trait or 
lack some desirable trait, cannot be defeated by counter-
examples. It consists of the attitude that the activities 
and achievements of women are less valuable than those 
of men, whatever those activities and achievements may 
be, and that is an attitude deeply embedded in our 
society. For example, it is well-known that the status and 
remuneration of elementary education, social work and 
home economics were greatly raised when men entered 
those fields. A boy who likes to play girls' games is far 
more worried-over by adults and despised by other 
children than a girl who likes to play boys' games. And 
homemaking, although it involves tasks that are ab-
solutely necessary to the well-being of every human 
being, is perhaps the lowest-status job of all, as shown by 
the ridicule and/or pity with which a male homemaker is 
regarded, while a woman doctor partakes of some, but 
not usually all, the status of a male doctor. 
As further evidence of this prejudice, we see that the 
pay for jobs done mostly by women is less than that for 
jobs done mostly by men, regardless of the skills, 
knowledge, training and effort involved. For example, 
until recently at the University of British Columbia the 
jobs with the lowest average salaries were jobs filled 
almost exclusively by women—Clerks, Secretaries, 
Library Assistants and Food Service Workers. 1 4 
While I do not think that sex prejudice alone accounts 
for this phenomenon, the expectations of both men and 
women that women will be paid less for the kind of work 
they do clearly help to perpetuate it. Supply and demand 
do not account for it, since, for example, skilled typists 
were obviously in shorter supply than men capable of 
raking leaves on the grounds crew. 
How might this kind of prejudice, this attitude that the 
activities and achievements of women are less valuable 
than those of men, enter into the process of comparing 
qualifications? When women and men applicants are be-
ing compared, it would certainly affect the weighing of 
different kinds of traits against each other; and if the 
prejudice extends to the achievements of individual 
women in normally male fields, it would also affect the 
comparison of their traits of the same kind. I will not try 
to argue here that the prejudice does extend to the 
achievements of women in normally male fields. There is 
evidence from academia that it does, but we need only 
realize that it is a practical possibility to become con-
cerned about its consequences.15 
We can see how employers who believe they are hiring 
strictly on the basis of qualifications may actually be hir-
ing on the basis of sex plus qualifications, i.e., the sex of 
the applicants enters into the hiring decision when the 
employers' comparisons of applicants' qualifications are 
warped by a tendency to undervalue the achievements of 
women. Employers may have a very clear idea of what 
sorts of traits count as qualifications for the job and even 
of what sorts of traits in an employee lead to excellence 
and innovation; they may stick very closely to comparing 
applicants only with regard to which of these traits they 
have and to what degree, and to selecting the best person 
for the job only on the basis of the comparison; and then 
they may bring in sex as a consideration in the com-
parison, perhaps without even realizing it. Thus, even 
with the firm intention of being objective, employers may 
discriminate against women by consistently hiring men 
over women with equal qualifications or by hiring men 
who are less qualified than women applicants. 
We will want to prevent the discrimination that arises 
from giving lower value to the activities and achieve-
ments of women, both because it puts women at a disad-
vantage in the hiring process, and because it is not in the 
public interest, since it gets in the way of having the truly 
best qualified person for the job. If we are to prevent it by 
means of anti-discrimination laws, we will have to be 
able to detect and prove it, and that brings us back to our 
old problem that to detect and prove cases of types No. 2 
and No. 3 discrimination we need a definition of 
'qualifications' and an unprejudiced method of com-
paring them. 
Let us assume we can get a good definition of 
'qualifications'—in effect a list of the necessary and 
beneficial traits for each job. We then need an un-
prejudiced procedure for weighing the different kinds of 
traits of applicants and an unprejudiced method of com-
paring the value of the same kinds of traits as had by dif-
ferent applicants. Only unprejudiced people with a 
thorough knowledge of the jobs to be done could give us 
either of these. Conceivably they could create an ordered 
list for each job that would rank traits from 'barely help-
ful' to 'absolutely necessary' and also rank combinations 
of traits. For some jobs, objective tests might be devised 
for comparing applicants' knowledge, skills and abili-
ties; but, in cases where we want to compare the quality 
of their experience, no fixed procedure could be used and 
each comparison would have to be validated by the 
judgment of some unprejudiced person experienced in 
the field of work. Often, as in most professional fields, 
the person doing a comparison of applicants' experience 
or potential must have the unprejudiced judgment of 
people in the field who have direct knowledge of the ap-
plicants' previous work. In short, we need the good 
judgment of large numbers of unprejudiced experts just 
to detect sex discrimination. Preventing it by means of 
detecting, proving and punishing cases is, of course, an 
even greater task, which would require even more un-
prejudiced people. And where are these unprejudiced 
people to come from, when the attitude of undervaluing 
the activities and achievements of women is deeply em-
bedded in a society? 
The possibility of preventing sex discrimination by 
means of anti-discrimination laws looks even more 
remote when we realize that so far we have only been con-
sidering the hiring process; yet if prejudice is embedded 
in the society, discrimination against females is probably 
putting them at a disadvantage long before they reach 
the hiring process: in admission to training and 
education and advancement through those systems, and 
long after it: in the pay and encouragements they receive 
at work and in promotion through the ranks of their oc-
cupations. The thought of the legions of unprejudiced 
people it would require to prevent all this is staggering, 
for the same difficulties of defining and comparing 
'qualifications' must be met in all these instances. 
HOW TO AVOID COMPARING QUALIFICATIONS 
If we cannot prevent sex discrimination by means of 
anti-discrimination laws and policies, how can we deal 
with the very serious disadvantage to women that 
discrimination presents? We could avoid the process of 
comparing qualifications, where sex prejudice most 
easily and subtly leads to discrimination, by requiring 
employers to hire randomly from among the applicants 
who have all the necessary qualifications. Or we could 
adopt Mary Anne Warren's suggested 'weak quota 
system,' which would require employers to hire women in 
the same proportions as they are found among the 
qualified applicants. The 'random hiring' policy would, 
in the long run and in large groups, result in the same 
percentage of women being hired as Warren's quota 
system, but the latter would avoid possible extreme 
deviations from that percentage in the short run and in 
small groups. Furthermore, the quota system allows for 
comparison of applicants with others of their sex and 
selection of the best qualified of each sex. 
Since by adopting either the random hiring policy or 
the weak quota system we would sacrifice the present 
(alleged) systematic search for the very best qualified 
person for each job, we could go further and move to 
counteract the effects of past discrimination by requiring 
employers to hire women preferentially from among the 
qualified applicants until the percentage of women 
working in each job category reflects the percentage of 
women among the qualified applicants. This sort of 
preferential hiring is essentially the 'numerical goals' 
policy originally required by the United States Equal 
Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) as part 
of affirmative action programs.1 6 A similar policy to that 
of the E E O C is proposed by the Saskatchewan Human 
Rights Commission as part of Special Programs the 
Commission may approve or order. The proposed 
Saskatchewan regulations state: 
Goals shall be based on the extent of un-
derrepresentation identified and on the availability 
of members of the target or protected groups who 
are qualified, or who can become qualified through 
reasonable efforts on the part of the sponsor 
organization, or who are eligible or who can 
become eligible through reasonable efforts on the 
part of the sponsor organization, for positions or 
places within the sponsor organization. 
'Underrepresentation' means having fewer mem-
bers of the target or protected groups in a par-
ticular sector, unit, grouping, classification, or 
level within the sponsor organization than would 
reasonably be expected by their representation in 
the population, or in those subclasses of the 
population defined by qualification, eligibility, or 
geography, from which the sponsor organization 
may reasonably be expected to draw its employees, 
students, tenants, clients, customers or members.1 7 
Of course, this sort of policy is not the only form of 
preferential hiring we could adopt to counteract the ef-
fects of past sex discrimination. We could, for instance, 
require employers to continue to hire women preferen-
tially after their percentage in a job category reflects their 
percentage among the qualified applicants or their per-
centage in the work force or their percentage in the 
population as a whole. If we assume that the percentage 
of women among the best qualified people for a job is the 
same as the percentage of women among the people 
qualified for that job, and if our only purpose in 
requiring employers to hire women preferentially is to 
prevent present discrimination and to counteract the ef-
fects of past discrimination in the hiring for that job 
category, then the most reasonable upper and lower 
limitation of hiring women preferentially is the point at 
which their percentage in the job category is equal to 
their percentage among the qualified applicants. 
If we assume that in the absence of women's past and 
present disadvantages, the probability that a woman 
would be the best qualified applicant for a given job 
would be the same as the probability that a man would 
be the best qualified applicant for it, we may want to 
require employers to hire women preferentially until 
their representation in a job category equals their 
representation in the work force or in the whole 
population. Such a policy would put the entire burden of 
correcting the effects of women's past and present disad-
vantages on the hiring process. Some of that burden 
should be placed on the improved education and en-
couragement of girls and on the re-training of women. 
Then we could use the percentage of women among the 
qualified applicants as an indicator of how effective our 
educational improvements have been and require em-
ployers to hire women preferentially until they are repre-
sented in the same jobs in the same proportions as they 
are among the qualified applicants. 
I have argued that if we want to prevent dis-
crimination, it is necessary in a sex-prejudiced society 
to prevent or limit the comparison of job applicants' 
qualifications. We could do this by adopting a weak 
quota system which would require that the percentage of 
women among the newly-hired reflect their percentage 
among the qualified applicants; or we could do it by 
adopting some form of preferential hiring of women. Any 
form of preferential hiring of women discriminates 
against qualified men, as it involves at least consistently 
hiring women over equally qualified men. Such a policy 
must be justified on the grounds that it is more worth-
while to make the percentage of women in all job 
categories reflect the percentage of qualified women ap-
plicants as soon as possible than to protect qualified men 
from discrimination against them. That it is more worth-
while has been argued by others on the basis of com-
pensatory justice and on the basis of long-range con-
sequences. But it is clear that we cannot rely on the en-
forcement of anti-discrimination legislation alone to 
prevent sex discrimination in a sex-prejudiced society.18 
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